Abstract. A game on a convex geometry is a real-valued function de ned on the family L of the closed sets of a closure operator which satis es the nite Minkowski-Krein-Milman property. If L is the Boolean algebra 2 N then we obtain a n-person cooperative game. Faigle and Kern investigated games where L is the distributive lattice of the order ideals of the poset of players. We obtain two classes of axioms that give rise a unique Shapley value for games on convex geometries. Finally, we consider the problem of computing the Shapley value for this games when the cardinal of the player set is small.
Convex geometries
The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework in which to analyze cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will axiomatize the structure of such allowable coalitions using the theory of convex geometries, a notion developed to combinatorially abstract geometric convexity. In this sense our model acts as a bridge between traditional cooperative game theory and spatial games, in which the (Euclidean) geometry controls the game. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. See, for instance 13] and 17] . Most closely related to our work is the work of Faigle and Kern 10] on cooperative games under precedence constraints. Their model is a special case of ours and our analysis follows their's quite closely.
The theory developed in this paper has already been applied in 8] and 9] to examine certain voting games. In the former, a new analysis of voting in a onedimensional issue space is examined, as well as an alternative to the Attitudinal Dependent index of Shapley (see also 19] and 18, Chapter XVI. 2] for spatial games using the generalized Shapley-Shubik index de ned in Section 3. This leads to a reinterpretation of the model of voting on the Supreme Court disussed by Frank and Shapley 12] . In 9] an empirical approach to voting on the current Supreme Court is taken using the ideas of convex geometries and a generalization of the Banzhaf index. We think that these new approaches to old problems provide ample evidence that the theory developed in this paper is of more than aesthetic interest.
We begin by de ning a convex geometry and describing some of their fundamental properties. Section 2 will de ne what we mean by a game on a convex geometry and in Section 3 we axiomatize the generalization of the Shapley value. In the last section we discuss how to compute these values in small games.
Let N be a nite set of cardinality n and consider a family L of subsets of N with the properties x; y = 2 A and y 2 A x imply x = 2 A y; for every A N: Edelman 5] showed the relationship between the anti-exchange closure and the meet-distributive lattices. We call the sets in a convex geometry convex sets. 1. L is a convex geometry. 2. If A 6 = N is a closed set then A x is closed for some x 2 N n A. Example: Let (P; ) be a poset. For any X P; X 7 ?! X := fy 2 P j y x for some x 2 Xg ;
de nes a closure operator on P. Its closed sets are the order ideals (down sets) of P, and we denote this lattice J(P). Since the union and intersection of order ideals is again an order ideal, it follows that J(P) is a sublattice of 2 P . Then J(P) is a distributive lattice and so, J(P) is a convex geometry closed under set-union and ex(S) is the set of all maximal points Max(S) of the subposet S 2 J(P). When P is nite, there is a 1{1 correspondence between antichains of P and order ideals.
Then the games (C; v) and (A; c), where C is the family of down sets of P 10] and A is the set of antichains of a hierarchy 11] are games on distributive lattices.
We consider the following f0; 1g-value games on L. where n = jNj and s = jSj. Kalai The Minkowski-Krein-Milman property yields that a player has individual power to join a convex coalition when it is an extreme point of the coalition. We will follow the work of Faigle and Kern for obtain an axiomatization of the Shapley value.
De nition 3. We can now give another axiomatization for the Shapley value of games on convex geometries. We consider the next axioms. F=ffg,f1g,f2g,f3g,f4g,f1,2g,f1,3g,f2,3g,f2,4g,f3,4g,f1,2,3g,f2,3,4g,f1,2 f1=5; 0; 2=5; 2=5g
